Complex Problems: The Multiplication of Doubt

In my last two posts which build the foundation of my epistemological framework, I have described how the complexity of problems can be defined through building a hierarchy of constructs and relationships in the order of their complexity. There, I briefly describe the most basic elements with a rudimentary explanation for its complexity ranking as a standalone element. To follow, I described the most basic element, existence, and the general concept of abstraction, which allows us to discuss doubt as a concept which is the abstraction of certainty.

Let us build on the previous discussion here of the nature of knowledge as being inherently probabilistic. Let the certainty of the truth of any given proposition X be represented as Pr(X) in standard statistical notation. Suppose X is some basic proposition with the lowest level of complexity: "The spoon exists," for example, where a spoon is observed on a table in front of you. Having experienced the spoon in front of you, and indeed, currently experiencing it in front of you, you would have supreme confidence in the existence of the spoon. You could not provide a logical proof of the spoon's existence, but you could say that you are as close to absolute certainty in this proposition as one may be; in other words, the limit of Pr(X) approaches 1 in this case. For ease of demonstration, let's suppose Pr(X) = 0.9999.

Existence, Abstraction, and Doubt

A proposition expressing existence takes the form "X is". This form of proposition is the most basic form and can serve as a building block from which other, more complex propositions can be constructed. Let us examine more closely the nature of existence and the implications for the use of existence as the lowest-order proposition.

Any animate being can be shown to demonstrate the awareness of existence. Animals, though they are not self-aware and thus may not be cognizant of the concept of existence, will nevertheless react to stimuli in a manner consistent with the awareness of this concept. A dog, for example, will not attempt to run through a wall; it recognizes the existence of the wall and can understand that its efforts would be in vain. It, perhaps, does not know this innately, but through experience it becomes highly confident that the wall exists. Similarly, its eyes will follow an object that it is interested in, such as a ball or a morsel of food; this action directly represents the recognition of the existence of those objects.

Orders of Complexity

If we assume that we, as humans, have no knowledge a priori from our creation, and that we instead are only more or less certain about any given proposition, then we must start to examine the most basic propositions in our world. The goal, in so doing, is not to determine some empirical probability that we have for any specific proposition or type of proposition, on average. Nor should we be naive enough to believe that we might be able to order our confidence in any two specific propositions. Although confidence can be expressed on a continuum from 0 to 1, we resign our practical ability to fall short of precisely determining our internal confidence in any given proposition, much less a strict comparison between two propositions in which we have similar confidence.

Rather, by examining some propositions, we can perhaps discover how our brains operate in practice, by producing a rough classification which distinguishes certain problems from others. Then, we might generally say that we are naturally inclined to be more confident in the truth of some propositions than others. Another way of stating our goal is that we might classify the order of complexity of a given proposition, based on the constituent elements of that proposition - much in the same way as a grammar teacher might be able to evaluate the complexity of a sentence based on the parts of speech, syntax, and vocabulary of which it is comprised.